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I.  Introduction  
  Many macroeconomists have argued that a central bank should be transparent about 
its objectives, its views about the economic outlook, and the reasoning behind its policy 
changes (see Faust and Leeper 2005). In 1994 the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) began to release statements accompanying changes in the federal funds rate 
target. Since then, the degree of specificity of the statements and the guidance provided 
on the likely course of future policy have evolved significantly.
1 In a recent paper, 
Woodford (2005) discusses two kinds of central-bank communications: current policy 
decisions and the central bank’s view of likely future policy. He articulates four 
categories of information—the central bank’s view of current economic conditions, 
current operating targets, strategies guiding policy decision making, and the outlook for 
future policy—that a central bank might seek to communicate to the public. Woodford 
argues that these open communications are “beneficial, not only from the point of view of 
reducing the uncertainty with which traders and other economic decision makers must 
contend, but also from that of enhancing the accuracy with which the FOMC is able to 
achieve the effects on the economy that it desires, by keeping the expectations of market 
participants more closely synchronized with its own.”  
                                                 
1 Kohn and Sack (2003) characterize several distinct periods of increasing transparency in FOMC 
statements:  statements on changes in the discount rate (1989–93), statements on changes in the federal 
funds rate (1994–98), statements including policy tilt (1998–99), and statements including assessment of 
the balance of risks (2000–04). In May 2003 a further refinement was added to separately state the 
committee’s views on the risks to inflation and growth. And, finally, in August 2003 the committee 
provided explicit guidance on the likelihood that policy would remain accommodative.    1
This article investigates whether the public’s views about the economy’s current 
path and about future policy have been affected by changes in the Federal Reserve’s 
communications policy as reflected in private-sector forecasts of future economic 
conditions and policy moves. In particular, has private agents’ ability to predict the 
direction of the economy improved since 1994, when the FOMC began to publicly state 
its views of the economic outlook? If so, on which dimensions has the ability to forecast 
improved? The analysis focuses on both the short-term and longer-term economic 
forecasts of key macroeconomic variables—such as inflation, gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth, and unemployment—and of policy variables such as short-term interest 
rates. Private agents’ current-year and next-year forecasts are used as proxies for the 
public’s short-term and longer-term expectations, and empirical evidence is presented 
regarding whether such forecasts have performed better in predicting future economic 
and policy conditions since 1994.  
The private-agent forecasts used in this article are those of individual participants 
as well as the consensus (average) forecasts contained in the monthly Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators surveys from 1986 to 2004, which include both the pre-FOMC-
statement subperiod (1986:01–1993:12) and the post-FOMC-statement subperiod 
(1994:01–2004:12). We employ the econometric methodology of Eisenbeis, Waggoner, 
and Zha (2002), which permits us to evaluate the accuracy of forecasts both in cross 
section and across time and to examine the errors in forecasting key economic variables 
on both a univariate and a multivariate basis. The latter is important because agents are 
not simply forecasting one economic variable but rather a set of variables that 
presumably are interrelated and jointly capture important dimensions of economic   2
performance. Good forecasts on one dimension but poor overall performance may 
provide some indication of the internal consistency of the forecaster’s approach. 
This cross-sectional data set enables us to decompose forecast accuracy into two 
components: the common error that affects all individual participants and the 
idiosyncratic error that reflects discrepant views across individuals about future economic 
and policy conditions.  According to Woodford (2005), one should expect the 
idiosyncratic error to become smaller as FOMC open communications become more 
transparent.   But the common error may not change much because it is likely to be 
affected by factors other than changes in policy transparency, such as unforeseen 
business cycles. 
To preview the main result, we find that since 1994 the idiosyncratic errors for key 
macroeconomic variables have steadily declined and the expectations of market 
participants are more closely synchronized to one another. We find no evidence, 
however, that the common error has become smaller since 1994, especially for the 
longer-term forecasts.  
    
II.  Methodology 
 Let  t μ  be a  1 n×  vector of economic variables at time t,  t y be the realized value of 
these economic variables, and 
i
t y  is the ith individual’s forecast value of the variables.  
Assume that  t y  is normally distributed with mean  t μ  and economy-wise (common) 
covariance matrix 
R
t Ω  and that 
i
t y  is normally distributed with mean  t μ  and forecast-
wise covariance matrix 
F
t Ω .  The super-scripts R stands for “realized” and F for   3
“forecast.”   The covariance matrix 
R
t Ω  reflects the aggregate shocks that affect the 
realized value of  t μ ; the covariance matrix 
F
t Ω  captures the discrepancy in forecasts 
across individual participants.  The assumption that the mean forecast among individual 
participants is  t μ  is reasonable because previous work has suggested that the Blue-Chip 
consensus forecast as a proxy to the mean forecast is close to being an unbiased estimate 
of  t μ  (Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner, and Zha, 2003).  Denote the forecast error for the ith 
forecaster by 
ii
ttt x yy =−.  It follows that the individual forecast error 
i
t x  has mean zero 
and variance matrix  
RF
ttt Ω =Ω +Ω , 
which indicates that 
i
t x  is subject to both idiosyncratic and common shocks.
2  The 




tt t t x xn χ
− ′ ≡Ω   , 
where  ()
2 chi n  denotes the chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom and 
i
t χ  is a 
square error weighted by  t Ω .  The above expression says that the weighted square error 
i
t χ  follows the chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom.  To measure the 
forecast accuracy for each individual participant, we compute a score value ( p-value)  
associated with this chi-square distribution and call it an “accuracy score.”  The score for 
individual forecaster i at forecast time t is a function of 
i
t χ  and n: 
( ) ( ) ,1 c h i 2 c d f ,
ii
tt p nn χχ =− , 
                                                 
2 In future research, we intend to relax the assumptions that the Consensus forecast is equal to  t μ  and 
idiosyncratic shocks are independent of common shocks.   4
where  ( ) chi2cdf ,
i
t n χ  is the probability that a random observation from the chi-square 
distribution with n degrees of freedom falls in the interval [0 
i
t χ ].
3   
  As Eisenbeis, Waggoner, and Zha (2002) pointed out, the summary measure 
() ,
i
t p n χ  is a probability that is invariant to the underlying scales of error variances.  It 
can be interpreted that the ith participant’s forecast is closer to the realized value than do 
100 () ,
i
t p n χ  percent of all possible forecasters.  Moreover, the score  () ,
i
t p n χ  can be 
compared across forecasters, within a forecast period, and across periods.  
  Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner, and Zha (2003) show how to estimate the covariance 
matrices 
R
t Ω  and 
F
t Ω .  The matrix 
R
t Ω  can be estimated as the sample covariance matrix 
of the Blue-Chip Consensus forecast errors across time under the assumption that 
R
t Ω  is 
the same across years for each month but varies across months within a year.   Thus, the 
variances on the diagonal of 
R
t Ω  become smaller as t gets closer to the end of the year, 
for more information becomes available to forecast economic conditions for the current 
year.  The covariance matrix 
F
t Ω  can be estimated as the sample covariance matrix of 
forecast errors across individual forecasters; this covariance varies both across months 
and across years.
4  The estimate of  t Ω , denoted by  ˆ
t Ω , is the sum of the estimates of 
R
t Ω  
and 
F
t Ω .  Given this estimate, the weighted square error can be calculated as  
1 ˆ ˆ
ii i
tt t t x x χ
− ′ =Ω . 
At each time t, the average accuracy score is  
                                                 
3 If the assumptions used are valid, the distribution of accuracy scores from 1986 to 2004 should be 
uniform.  We have verified that such a distribution is  more or less uniform, taking into account small-
sample uncertainty.     5
()
1









= ∑ , 
where  t N  is the number of individual forecasters at time t.  One can also calculate the 
cross-sectional distribution of accuracy scores, which is described in detail in Box I.   
III. Vintage Data and Forecast Errors 
The monthly Blue-Chip Economic Indicators report the forecasts of key 
macroeconomic variables for the current and next years.  We study the annual average 
forecasts of five key variables: the 3-month treasury bill rate, the consumer price index 
(CPI) inflation rate, real gross national product (GNP) for 1986 to 1995 or real gross 
domestic product (GDP) from 1996 to 2004, the unemployment rate, and the long-term 
bond yield (the corporate bond yield from 1986 to 1995 or the ten-year treasury note 
yield from 1996 to 2004.  The three-month T-bill rate, the CPI inflation rate, the 
unemployment rate, and the long-term bond yield are monthly variables while real 
GNP/GDP is a quarterly variable.  This frequency difference is important to note when 
evaluating forecasts.   
As the year gets close to the end, more information is available about the actual 
current-year data and therefore the forecast errors for both the current and next years get 
smaller.   For example, the forecasters participating in the December Blue Chip survey 
will have data monthly data on the three-month T-bill rate and the long-term bond yield 
through November.  They will have data on the unemployment rate through October or 
November.  They will have data on the CPI inflation rate through October.  However, 
since GNP/GDP is released quarterly, forecasters will only have information regarding 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Other estimates can also be constructed using model-based methods.     6
GNP/GDP through the third quarter of the year.  The weighted square error  ˆ
i
t χ  is 
designed to avoid the influence of different amounts of available data so that the errors 
are comparable across time.   
To gauge forecast errors, the realized values of each variable at a given time must 
be used.  The values of some of variables are revised over time by the agencies 
responsible for reporting those variables.   In particular, real GNP/GDP is reported 
quarterly and revised twice.  Every year additional benchmark revisions may be made in 
July to the past data of GDP.  Hence, what is reported are the continuously changing 
estimates of the final values of many key economic variables.  Finally, sometimes the 
definition of GDP is changed and the series is completely revised.    With such revisions 
taking place, the question arises as to what vintage data should one use to evaluate 
forecast errors?  From a macro policy perspective, we would argue that the focus should 
be on the “best” estimate of the final value of the variable of interest.  However, often 
that value is not known for several years, and sometimes the difference between even a 
preliminary estimate and its nearest neighbor estimates can be very large.   For example, 
the advanced estimate for real GDP for Q1 2005 was 3.1% which was revised up by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis from 3.4% and finally to 3.8% as more data on the 
performance of the economy became available.  The difference between the first and 
most recent estimate could cause policy makers to infer that the economy was growing 
below trend according to the first number, but above trend based on the final estimate.  
Such differences could have significantly different implications for policy.  For this 
reason, we would argue that the focus should be on forecast methods that best 
approximate the final number rather than the initial estimate.  Moreover, with such a   7
focus, a priori knowledge of the expected performance of a model or forecasting method, 
can help inform the policy maker as to which evidence to give greater weight to, when 
there are significant differences between the initial releases of data and forecasts of those 
data.  
For the purposes of this study of the current-year forecasts, we use the vintage 
data available at the end of January following the current year; and for the next-year 
forecasts, we use the data available at the end January following the next year.  We use 
vintage data so that the results here will be comparable with previous studies.  We also 
provide a comparison between the average Blue Chip Consensus score using vintage and 
final data, using January 2005 data as our final data.   
 
 
IV. Accuracy Scores 
  In this section we look at the distribution of scores at each month and examine 
whether the distribution has changed over time, especially from the pre-statement sub-
period to the post-statement period.  The technical details of how to characterize the 
cross-sectional distribution of scores are provided in Box I. 
Chart 1A shows the time-series paths of average scores and standard deviations of 
scores for the current year and Chart 1B shows the time-series paths of skewness and 
kurtosis for the current year.  Charts 2A and 2B show the similar paths for the next year. 
The measure of standard deviation is often used to approximate the volatility of the 
public’s expectations or forecasts at each point in time.   As it can be seen from Chart 1A, 
the average score fluctuates over time and so does the standard deviation of scores.   
There are no noticeable differences in the degree of fluctuation before and after 1994, and   8
nor are there differences for any sub-periods after 1994. There is no trend in which the 
average score has increased or the standard deviation of scores had decreased since 1994.  
There are clearly periods when forecasters made big errors, such as missing the onset of 
the recessions in 1990 and 2001.  In addition, while the average scores have increased in 
the 2004, so have the standard deviations of those scores.  Similarly, the average scores 
dropped significantly in 1995, which is mainly caused by the definition change of the 
GDP series.  In January of 1996 the Bureau of Economic Analysis changed the 
measurement of GDP to a chain-weighted system, but the forecasts made before January 
1996 might be based on the non-chain-weighted series.  Interestingly, this change seems 
having relatively less effect on the longer-term forecast errors (Chart 2B).     
The average score for the next year (Chart 2A) shows no improvement since 1994 
and in fact appears to have drifted lower since 1996.  There has been a steady upward 
drift in the standard deviation of the scores since 2001.  The pattern of the drift in the 
standard deviation is similar to that which occurred just prior to and coming out of the 
90-91 recession.   As will be discussed further in the next section, these lower scores after 
1996 are most likely associated with the nature of the business cycle and unexpected 
growth in productivity that surged in the late 1990s.   
We now look at the skewness and kurtosis of accuracy scores (Charts 1B and 2B).  
Skewness measures how asymmetric the score distribution is.  The more negative this 
measure is, the more scores spread out toward 0%.  Conversely, the more positive this 
measure is, the more scores spread out toward 100%.  Kurtosis measures how likely the 
score distribution has extreme outliers that may affect the average score.  The bigger the 
value of this measure is, the more likely we have outliers in the score distribution.  For   9
the current-year forecasts, the skewness and kurtosis have remained stable except for a 
few periods (Chart 1B).  The spike that occurred in 1995 is due to the redefinition of 
GDP and the small spikes around 2001 are associated with the recent recession.  For the 
next-year forecasts, again, there is no clear pattern or trend in which skewness and 
kurtosis have changed since 1994 (Chart 2B).  There were a couple of spikes in skewness 
and kurtosis, whose periods correspond to the Asian financial crisis and the recent 
recession.   
To provide further information about distributional changes of accuracy scores, 
we display in Chart 3 the time-series paths of accuracy scores of Blue-Chip consensus 
forecast and the average of the top and bottom 5 forecasts for each month.  The current-
year results are reported in Chart 3A and the next-year results are in Chart 3B.  The 
consensus forecast is of particular interest because its score is on average the highest (see 
Appendix II for details) and because it performs better than any single individual 
forecaster over the sample.  Again, it can be seen from Chart 3 that there is no tendency 
that these scores have improved over time since 1994.   In fact, the scores of consensus 
forecasts appear to be slightly lower after 1996 than before, especially for the next-year 
forecast.  Moreover, the drop in the consensus scores around the recent recession and 
again following 9/11 in 2001, suggests that events and exogenous shocks affected 
forecast performance much more than FOMC statements. The drop in the scores towards 
the end of 1995 is due to the redefinition of GDP.  We also show the average scores for 
the top five forecasters in each period as well as the average score for the 5 poorest 
performers.  The evidence suggests that data have fat tails, with most of the forecasts 
being clustered at the high end with a few really poor performers on the bottom.     10
All these findings suggest that the individual participant’s forecast performance 
relative to other participants has not improved between the pre-statement and post-
statement periods.   Although the accuracy score is a powerful summary measure of 
forecasting performance, it is a nonlinear function of the square forecast errors weighted 
by the overall covariance matrix  t Ω .  It would be informative to separate  t Ω  and forecast 
errors for further analysis.  In the next section, we examine whether the covariance matrix 
F
t Ω  has changed over time and study the sources of forecast errors that do not depend on 
F





V.  Transparency and Sources of Forecast Errors 
  Kohn and Sack (2003) and Woodford (2005) argue that the contents in 
FOMC statements have become more transparent since 1994.   It is therefore important to 
see whether the expectations of market participants via the forecasts of key economic 
variables have become more synchronized in the post-statement period than in the pre-
statement sub-period.  If there is useful information content in the statement, then one 
might expect that there may be an overall improvement in forecast accuracy, ceteris 
paribus, or at least more agreement among forecasters (ie. a tighter distribution of 
idiosyncratic errors.) A positive answer may provide evidence about the effects of the 
FOMC statements on the private sector’s agreement on the direction of the future 
economy.    
We also examine the sources of forecast errors by directly decomposing the mean 
square error (MSE) into the idiosyncratic component reflecting the discrepancy in 
                                                 
5 The reader may recall that by assumption 
R
t Ω  does not change from one year to another.  We intend to   11
individual participants from the Surveys and the common component that is associated 
with unanticipated aggregate shocks and affects all participants.  The technical details of 
this decomposition are provided in Box II.   
  The MSE is the average of square errors across individual forecasters.  Arguably, 
both the idiosyncratic and common errors may show a decreasing trend if there is useful 
information in the statement and forecasters gain better understanding of the economy 
over time, especially since 1994.  To the extent that the common error is affected by 
exogenous aggregate shocks, and the distribution of the shocks is not constant, the there 
may be no clear inference about the size of the common error.  However, we hypothesize 
that the more important impact is likely to be seen for the idiosyncratic component, in 
that the idiosyncratic errors should be tighter – that is there should be greater agreement 
among the forecasters.  The empirical results presented below confirm this hypothesis.  
  We first study how synchronized the expectations of market participants are.  The 
degree of synchronization is measured by the cross-sectional standard deviations of all 
the variables, which are equal to square roots of the diagonal elements of 
F
t Ω .  Charts 4-8 
report the cross-sectional standard deviation of each of the five macroeconomic variables 
considered in this paper.  Charts 4A-8A display the standard deviations for both the 
current-year and next-year forecasts; Charts 4B-8B display the 12-month moving 
averages of the standard deviations to show the trend more clearly.  It is clear from these 
charts that for not only the interest rates but also the other variables, the trend has been 
downward and the standard deviations after 1994 tend to be smaller than before 1994.  
These findings suggest that individual participants’ forecasts have indeed been more 
                                                                                                                                                 
relax this assumption in future research.   12
synchronized since 1994, both in terms of their overall view of the economy and of the 
interest rate variable most closely tied to policy.  
  We now study the decompositions of forecast errors for each of the five key 
macroeconomic variables.  Charts 9-14 show the time-series paths of decompositions for 
individual variables as well as all the variables jointly.  As evident in Panel A of each 
chart of Charts 9-14, one uniform result is that the time path of idiosyncratic errors shows 
a pattern of steady decline as well as very seasonal pattern for the current-year forecasts.  
Within the current year, the individual participant’s forecast error becomes much smaller 
as the time gets close to December.    The seasonal pattern is much less obvious for the 
next-year forecasts (Panel B of each chart of Charts 9-14), partly because the uncertainty 
about the economy next year is still large even if one tries to forecast as of December last 
year.   For both the current-year and next-year forecasts we see a clear pattern of smaller 
idiosyncratic errors after 1994.  Again, these results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that individual forecasts have been more synchronized since 1994.   
Patterns of common errors are distinctively different from those of idiosyncratic 
ones and the difference seems to be associated with business cycles unrelated to the 
FOMC statements.  One can see from Charts 9-14 that the common errors in the current 
year forecast are large relative to the idiosyncratic errors, whereas the common errors are 
dominant in the next year forecasts.  But there is no apparent pattern that the common 
errors are smaller after 1994 than before.  
  According to Chart 9A, the unusually large common errors for the current-year 
forecasts of the short-term interest rate occur in 2001.  These common errors are 
associated with the unexpected sharp decline of the federal fund rate.  The large common   13
errors of longer-term (next-year) forecasts seem to be associated with missing the turning 
point of the federal funds rate in the early 2000s and failing to predict the unchanged rate 
in 2002 and 2003 (Chart 9B).   
  For CPI inflation, except for a couple of unusually large common errors before 
1994, the common errors of the current-year forecasts have the similar patterns before 
and after 1994 (Chart 10A).  The common errors for the next-year forecasts tend to be 
larger in the period after 1996 than before (Chart 10B), and there shows no tendency that 
these errors have become smaller than before 1994.  
  Typically as the time gets closer to the end of the year, both idiosyncratic and 
common errors become smaller for the current year forecasts.  But for 1995, there are 
unusually large common errors of the current-year forecasts of real GNP/GDP towards 
the end of 1995, caused mainly by the definition change of the GDP series.  These errors 
are amplified when divided by the diminishing variances of forecast errors, which 
explains the steep drop of accuracy scores toward the end of 1995 in Chart 3A.  In Chart 
11A, the errors are not divided by the variances of forecast errors and thus are not as 
visually dramatic as in Chart 3A.   The substantial, persistent common errors of the next-
year forecasts in the late 1990s are consistent with the sustained increase in productivity 
growth largely unexpected by the public, while the federal funds rate did not change 
much in the late 1990s.    
  The common errors in forecasting the unemployment rate for the current year 
appear to be somewhat smaller after 1994 than before, but those errors for the next year 
have similar patterns before and after 1994 (Charts 12A and 12B).  The large common   14
errors for the next-year forecasts have much to do with business cycles and with the 
errors in predicting output growth (Chart 12B). 
  There are no clear patterns in which the common forecast errors of the long-term 
bond yield have become smaller since 1994 (Charts 13A and 13B).  In particular, the 
errors around the recent recession are relatively large in magnitude.    It is interesting, 
however, that there was a noticeable drop in the idiosyncratic errors in both the current 
year and next year forecast after 1987 when Chairman Greenspan became chairman and 
the effects of the stock market problems dissipated.    
  Charts 14A and 14B summarize the decomposition of the MSE for all the five 
variables combined.  For the current-year forecasts, the seasonal pattern is evident, as 
explained early in this article.   For the next-year forecasts, the large common errors 
occurred in the periods around the last two recessions.  The persistent and volatile 
common errors since 1994 are mainly due to the correlation effect among forecast errors 
across variables, because the forecast errors for individual variables other than GNP/GDP 
do not share these features.  Overall there is no evidence that the public’s forecasts of key 
macroeconomic variables have improved since 1994, following the FOMC’s efforts to 
increase transparency.   
Table 1 reports the average of percentages of the MSE that are attributed to the 
idiosyncratic component and the common component.  Two methods are used to compute 
the average percent contributions.  The first method is to calculate the percent 
contributions of idiosyncratic and common errors for each period and then average over 
all the periods.  This method helps eliminate outliers of extremely large errors, so the   15
results may not conform to the impression by looking at the charts.  The top panel of 
Table 1 reports these results. 
The second method is to accumulate the forecast errors of both types throughout 
the entire sample and then calculate the percent contributions of idiosyncratic and 
common errors.  The results generated by this method are reported in the bottom panel of 
Table 1.  This method is likely to be influenced by outliers but will be consistent with the 
impression given by the charts.   
Let us look at the top panel of Table 1 first.  For the current-year forecasts, except 
for GNP/GDP the idiosyncratic errors contribute much more to the total errors than the 
common errors, despite the fact that the common errors are much larger at times.  But 
when one examines all the variables jointly, the common errors become more important.  
This result implies that while it may be relatively easy to predict a single variable, the 
problem of predicting a set of economic variables may be more difficult.
6  As for the 
longer-term (next-year) forecasts, the picture is completely different: the common errors 
are clearly a driving force for almost all variables (except for CPI), individually and 
jointly. 
Compared to the top panel of Table 1, the results from the bottom panel give more 
dominate role to the common errors, partly because the common errors are much larger 
than the idiosyncratic errors in some periods.   All in all, it is clear that the common 
errors play a dominant role in overall forecast errors.   
This finding suggests that unexpected shocks, which of course are also not 
anticipated in the FOMC statements, are dominant factors in affecting forecast 
                                                 
6 One might also infer that there are different models being used and they perform better on some variables 
than others, but in aggregate there are significant differences among the forecasts.   16
performance, and improvements in policy transparency would be unlikely to make the 
forecast errors smaller except on the margins.
7 Another possibility is that clearer patterns 
may show up as more observations become available; the FOMC only began in August 
2003 to provide explicit guidance on the likely path of future policy and state-contingent 
economic conditions in the future. Given the data available today, however, we find no 
empirical evidence of significant improvement in the common forecast errors over the 
period in which the FOMC attempted to clarify its views of the economy or the likely 
course for future policy. This finding does not necessarily suggest that the movement 
toward transparency has been a failure.  It may simply indicate that no new information 
was provided in the statements that had not already been inferred by market participants.  
Given the unpredictable nature of business cycles, moreover, the common error may be 
mostly affected by factors other than monetary policy transparency.   
 
VI. Vintage Data Versus Final Data 
One could argue that whenever forecast errors are evaluated, final data available 
at that time should be used.  The reason is obvious.  From a policy perspective, being able 
to predict well initially released data that subsequently get revised, may lead to policy 
errors, especially when close to turning points or where the revisions may substantially 
change one’s view of the economy.  However, when policy formulation relies heavily 
upon model forecasts, it is important that those forecasts capture, as best as possible the 
true underlying paths for key economic variables.  If they do not, then the risk of series 
policy errors may be increased. Furthermore, how to choose the vintage data at various 
                                                 
7 This interpretation is consistent with the results of Stock and Watson (2003) and Sims and Zha 
(forthcoming).    17
points in time is completely arbitrary, and there is not statistical or economical foundation 
for such an arbitrary decision.  The public knows that data such as GDP are often revised 
and sometimes thoroughly revised.  They take such unpredictable outcomes into account 
and make their forecasts as accurately as possible on average.   
  In this section, we use the revised and most currently available data at the 
beginning of 2005 to re-compute the forecast errors.  Chart 15 displays the Blue Chip 
Consensus accuracy scores with the vintage data and the final data for both the current-
year and next-year forecasts.  Interestingly, the scores using final data do not fall 
considerably.  The average current-year score using vintage data is 70.9 while the 
average current-year score using final data is 67.0, just 3.9 points lower.  For the next-
year forecast scores there is very little difference between the scores using vintage and 
final data.  The average score using vintage data is 57.4 while the average score using 
final data is 56.4.  There are several periods, in 1992, 1995-1996, and in 1998 where the 
next-year forecast score was lower using final data, but at the same time there are several 
periods (1994, 1999 and 2002) where it is higher.  These results indicate that future data 
revisions are random enough such that they do not introduce a bias that does not 
significantly negatively affect forecast scores on average.  More important, it also 
suggests that the data revisions do not pose significant risks for policy makers. 
One would expect, perhaps, a greater disparity between the two scores given that 
additional revision errors are unpredictable.  However, an important advantage of using 
the final data is that one can avoid the distorted forecast errors of GDP caused by the data 
revision in 1995.  Comparing Chart 6A with Chart 11A, one can see that the distortion is 
completely eliminated when the final data are used to measure the forecast accuracy.    18
Still, we find that when the 1995 period is excluded the difference between the current-
year scores using vintage and final data increases from 3.9 to 7.7.  Looking more closely 
at the source of this difference, we find that it can be mostly attributed to the forecast 
error for GNP/GDP. 
Chart 16 displays the decompositions of forecast errors for GNP/GDP using the 
final data as realized values.  Comparing this chart with Chart 11, one can see that there 
are some notable differences in the breakdown in the composition for both the current-
year and next-year forecasts.  In Chart 11A, we see larger overall errors in 1992 and in 
the 1996 to 2004 period.  These larger errors are due to increases in error attributable to 
the common component of the forecast error.  Consequently, a greater proportion of the 
error each period is due to the common component.  The average contribution of the 
common component to the overall error rises to 73.9 percent from 56.7 percent.  In 
addition, the overall error in 1995 using vintage data (which resulted from the changing 
to chain-weighted GDP) is no longer present.  For the next-year forecasts in Chart 11B, 
we again see that the overall error has increased but to a considerably more modest 
degree.  The overall forecast error prior to the 1990-91 recession is less using final data 
but is greater (on aggregate) for the 1996 to 2000 period.  But once again, this increase in 
overall error is attributable to the common component of the forecast error.  The average 
contribution of the common component of the overall error rises to 61.8 percent from 
59.0 percent.   
Our findings suggest there may make little difference to use final data or vintage 
data when evaluating forecasts.  We have shown that the average Blue Chip Consensus 
score was modestly affected for current-year forecasts and was almost unchanged for   19
next-year forecasts.  In addition, we have shown that the decrease in score for current-
year and next-year forecasts was as a result of an increase in the common component of 
the forecast error and did not affect the idiosyncratic component.  Therefore, the effect of 
a switch to final data for evaluating individual forecasts scores should be roughly equal 
across forecasts.  And lastly, the use of final data eliminates the need for arbitrarily 
choosing among different vintages. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
In 1994 the FOMC began to release statements after each meeting. The amount of 
policy information released in the statements has increased and changed over time. The 
findings from Kohn and Sack (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) suggest that 
financial markets are sensitive to the information revealed in these statements. While 
knowing whether the statements have affected markets is important, understanding 
whether the statements are providing strong signals concerning the FOMC’s views about 
the future path of the economy or economic policy is also important. That is, has the 
public’s ability to forecast future economic and financial conditions improved since 
1994? This question is important because one hopes that transparency, if appropriately 
communicated, enhances market participants’ ability to forecast (Woodford 2005). 
This article analyzes the forecast errors across a large section of forecasters and 
for a set of five key macroeconomic variables. The analysis finds evidence that the 
individuals’ forecasts have been more synchronized since 1994, implying the possible 
effects of the FOMC’s transparency. On the other hand, we find little evidence that the 
common forecast errors, which are the driving force of overall forecast errors, have 
become smaller since 1994. In fact, common forecast errors have increased and have   20
become more volatile on several dimensions. These common errors seem to be associated 
with business cycles and other economic shocks. Transparent monetary policy may not 
necessarily enhance the public’s predictability of business cycles.  
On the other hand, it is possible that we do not have a long-enough sample to observe the 
effects of transparency because the FOMC just began in August 2003 to provide more 
explicit guidance on the likely path of future policy and its contingency on future 
economic conditions. We hope that our findings will generate more research on this 
important topic. 
 
Box I  Characterizing the Distribution of Accuracy Scores 
  The distribution of accuracy scores can be summarized by the first four moments.  
We show how to calculate the mean or average score  ˆ () t p n  in the text.  In this appendix 
we show how to calculate the other three moments: standard deviation, skewnesss, and 

































































where σ  stands for the standard deviation, s the skewness, and u the kurtosis.   
Box II  Decomposition of Mean Square Error   21
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Note that  ˆt μ  is also the Blue-Chip consensus forecast.  The weighted mean square error 
at time t can be decomposed as 
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where the first term at the right hand side is the MSE attributed to the idiosyncratic 
component and the second term is the MSE attributed to the common component.  The 
cross term is zero because  
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Appendix I: Data Description 
Three-month Treasury bill rate: 1986-2004.  Secondary market, monthly average.  
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Consumer price index: 1986-2004.  CPI-U (all urban consumers).  Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 
Gross national/domestic product: 1986-1995, not chained; 1996-2004, chained.  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Unemployment rate: 1986-2004.  All 16 years or older workers.  Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.   22
Corporate bond yield: 1986-1995.  Aaa, monthly average.  Source: Moody’s Investors 
Service, Inc. 
Ten-year Treasury note yield: 1996-2004.  Constant maturity, monthly average.  
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
Appendix II: Scores and Ranks for Individual Forecasters 
In this appendix we report in Table 2 the average scores for all the individual forecasters 
who have continued to participate in the surveys in recent years.  We include also the 
consensus forecast and the Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) model.  The BVAR 
model is often used in the empirical literature as a benchmark for model comparison 
(Robertson and Tallman 1999, 2001), and reporting the real-time forecasting performance 
of this model is of particular interest to academic researchers.   We also report other 
forecasters’ scores toward the end of the table for completeness.  The years in which each 
forecaster participated in the Survey are also reported in the table.   23
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Chart 2A 
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Chart 3A 
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Chart 4A 
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Chart 4B 
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Chart 5A 
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Chart 5B 
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Chart 6A 
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Chart 6B 
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Chart 7A 
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Chart 8A 
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Chart 9A 







































































































































































































































































































































Idiosyncratic Error Common Error Overall MSE Federal Funds Rate (rhs)
Sept 11, 2001
   33
Chart 10A 
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Chart 11A 
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Chart 12A 
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Chart 13A 







































































































































































































































































































































Idiosyncratic Error Common Error Overall MSE Federal Funds Rate (rhs)
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Chart 14A 
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Table 1 
 
Decomposition of Mean Square Error
By Average Percent Contribution to Error in Each Period
Current Year Forecasts (1986 - 2004) All Variables 3MTB CPI GDP UR 10YTB
44.5 57.0 69.7 43.3 64.0 58.7
55.5 43.0 30.3 56.7 36.0 41.3
Next Year Forecasts (1986 - 2003) All Variables 3MTB CPI GDP UR 10YTB
30.0 40.0 52.7 41.0 36.6 48.5
70.0 60.0 47.3 59.0 63.4 51.5
By Percent Contribution of Total Error Across Sample
Current Year Forecasts (1986 - 2004) All Variables 3MTB CPI GDP UR 10YTB
31.9 30.9 40.6 28.0 39.6 32.0
68.1 69.1 59.4 72.0 60.4 68.0
Next Year Forecasts (1986 - 2003) All Variables 3MTB CPI GDP UR 10YTB
22.1 15.1 38.6 20.1 24.7 32.1















   39
Chart 15A 































































































































Real Time Actual Data Jan2005 Data for Actual
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Chart 16A 



































































































































































Idiosyncratic Error Common Error Overall MSE Federal Funds Rate (rhs)
* Using January 2005 Data as Actual Data








































































































































































Idiosyncratic Error Common Error Overall MSE Federal Funds Rate (rhs)
* Using January 2005 Data as Actual Data








   Overall   Current Year   Next Year   Participation













 CY   NY
BC- Average of Top 10 82.24 16.86 86.45 15.99 77.81 16.66 228 216
BC Consensus 64.36 23.49 70.92 24.07 57.43 20.77 228 216
Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC 62.58 27.71 71.57 26.25 53.10 26.06 227 215
Schwab Washington Research Grou 62.04 28.26 69.97 27.11 53.64 27.07 197 186
Atlanta BVAR 59.69 31.19 69.21 29.54 49.64 29.75 228 216
U.S. Trust Co. 59.25 27.15 64.61 26.25 49.96 26.25 227 131
ClearView Economics 59.23 28.94 66.69 27.72 50.10 27.99 66 54
Banc of America Corp. 59.22 27.10 63.28 27.82 54.87 25.68 204 190
Northern Trust Company 58.75 28.01 63.34 27.27 53.17 27.95 222 183
Wayne Hummer & Co. 55.89 27.27 58.05 27.61 53.58 26.78 228 214
Moody's Investors Service 55.04 28.03 65.77 28.63 42.35 21.34 78 66
Perna Associates 54.61 26.31 60.90 28.35 47.82 22.08 167 155
Merrill Lynch 54.50 27.41 58.36 28.97 50.32 25.02 206 190
Wells Capital Management 53.58 28.71 59.83 28.19 46.83 27.81 161 149
National Assn. of Home Builders 53.56 26.06 58.77 26.69 47.93 24.21 176 163
Nomura Securities 52.55 28.87 55.77 29.82 48.57 27.41 63 51
Nat. City Bank of Cleveland 52.01 26.08 56.75 26.56 46.93 24.61 224 209
DuPont 51.68 25.60 57.06 28.14 46.00 21.23 228 216
Georgia State 51.67 27.39 51.72 28.64 51.62 26.07 223 211
Fannie Mae 51.43 28.00 59.67 29.13 41.81 23.35 84 72
DaimlerChrysler AG 51.34 29.13 58.94 29.24 43.35 26.85 226 215
Standard & Poors 51.25 30.43 58.86 30.09 42.78 28.63 120 108
Eggert Economic Enterprises 50.79 25.90 50.12 27.56 51.48 24.09 225 215
Siff, Oakley, Marks, Inc. 50.66 28.19 56.56 27.41 44.77 27.78 197 197
Evans, Carrol and Associates 50.43 29.77 58.01 30.35 42.86 27.21 202 202
Bank One 49.82 31.39 56.87 31.75 42.21 29.22 205 190
Bear Steams & Co., Inc. 49.67 29.96 53.11 30.39 43.95 28.59 98 59
BC- Ave of Individual Scores 48.13 16.08 51.84 16.22 44.21 15.00 228 216
La Salle National Bank 47.47 29.73 54.13 32.16 40.22 24.97 158 145
Prudential Securities 47.07 31.41 47.40 33.06 46.57 28.88 175 117
Prudential Financial 47.01 26.68 50.54 28.97 43.31 23.55 201 192
Goldman Sachs & Co. 46.28 27.19 59.47 25.49 30.49 19.85 79 66
National Assn. of Realtors 46.10 29.24 51.08 29.08 40.10 28.56 64 53
Conference Board 45.08 29.38 52.22 31.03 37.46 25.46 224 210
Chamber of Commerce, USA 44.97 27.68 48.35 28.34 41.20 26.50 214 192
General Motors Corporation 44.30 28.03 46.05 29.42 42.42 26.40 162 150
Econoclast 43.29 27.13 42.32 30.94 44.32 22.44 227 215
Eaton Corporation 43.04 28.51 40.92 30.07 45.37 26.62 127 115
Turning Points (Micrometrics) 43.04 27.86 41.15 29.28 45.04 26.19 185 174
Comerica 42.41 25.44 43.88 29.34 40.84 20.41 178 166
UCLA Business Forecast 42.12 30.19 45.32 32.23 38.75 27.55 227 215
Motorola, Inc. 42.02 28.76 50.83 31.73 31.91 20.92 102 89
J P Morgan Chase 40.92 27.12 47.57 29.12 33.40 22.55 104 92
Kellner Economic Advisers 40.79 23.00 41.86 24.65 39.55 21.02 91 79
Genetski.com 40.46 32.50 50.61 32.88 29.53 28.37 154 143
Wachovia Securities 40.39 27.19 44.60 31.05 35.69 21.33 98 88
Federal Express Corp. 39.92 26.15 41.80 28.76 37.63 22.60 65 53
DRl-WEFA 39.02 27.09 48.32 28.48 27.99 20.65 77 65
Morgan Stanley & Co. 35.95 29.39 38.27 31.92 32.30 24.75 85 54
Inforum-U. of Md. 35.72 26.46 33.15 27.15 38.46 25.47 222 208
Deutsche Banc Alex Brown 30.71 28.22 31.86 26.76 29.08 30.33 91 64
Naroff Economic Advisors 29.96 28.67 33.36 32.65 25.86 22.59 70 58
Ford Motor Company 25.80 25.12 27.32 26.09 23.69 23.73 103 74
BC- Average of Bottom 10 7.50 6.35 6.12 6.32 8.96 6.05 228 216 
 
 
 